

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, NPIC *FBI*  
John: *- Some random comments*

I found   paper interesting but not terribly enlightening as to any specific action to undertake. The points about the competitive evaluation and fitness reports will be addressed (as I understand it) in your proposal to revamp the CSB procedures.

The most persistent problem that we have not really addressed ourselves to in the way of anything new is the communication gap spoken of between the top two layers of management and the two layers just below. The Communications Seminar Report also spoke to this point and made some suggestions which have not been followed up on as yet. One thing we can do fairly easily is to include Division Chiefs at the Staff Mtg (say once

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25X1 a month) at which Art, [ ] and you could make comments concerning policy and generally pass the word. The main method of bridging the gap to the Division & Branch Chiefs is now the twice-weekly Morning Briefing and here you are only primarily speaking to the IEG second echelon.

<sup>Possible</sup>  
The second communication gap narrower is some sort of an in-house newsletter. If we take this route, however, we must be prepared to pay the cost which I would guess to be something close to one-half million a year if we are to do the job adequately.

25X1 [ ] last paragraph concerning the need of a measure of productivity is a good one. PPBS has been grappling more or less unsuccessfully with this for sometime and I think we need to periodically reaffirm with [ ] the need to press on.

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PERSONNEL MATTERS

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1. A cardinal point to remember in making any change in the handling of NPIC personnel matters is the necessity of keeping control. In an overly simplistic view, this is what the "NPIC Problem" and the reorganization were all about. NPIC had been an action oriented outfit. A high premium was placed on aggressive improvisation. The expanding nature of the operation and the protection (or insulation) afforded by tight security compartmentation were very forgiving of the cost of such free wheeling - whether in dollars or in the efficiency of the operation. If recidivism sets in there will be another crisis.

2. How to exert control in an effective manner, without an undue expenditure of effort, and at the same time encouraging the development of responsible decentralization is the \$64 question. I think the approach should be to identify the pressure points and provide a mechanism for ensuring that those given certain authority to get the job done find it essential to their survival as supervisors and managers to do a responsible and effective job. In spite of the existing superstructure, I believe more effective control and guidelines are needed. This does not necessarily mean a more elaborate superstructure. There has been too much management by committee in the Center in my opinion. A welcome and more efficient alternative would be the assignment of clear-cut lines of individual authority and responsibility without surrendering control in the larger sense.

3. This presupposes, of course, that supervisors and managers know what is wanted. People must know much better than they have in

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the past just what is desired. This is particularly true at the branch and division level. The Center has chronically suffered from a tendency for the two top layers of the organization to talk with each other and the layers below them to talk with each other, and with too little communication and identity of objectives between them. Thus, the division and/or branch chiefs tend to feel that they are confronted with conflicting and capriciously changing guidance, that higher authority really doesn't know what it wants, that what it seems to want frequently isn't best for it or can't be done anyway, and that if higher authority would stop interfering, the branches and divisions would get the job done, including the handling of personnel matters. Though this is overdrawn, it makes a point. To get the kind of responsive, imaginative cooperation that is needed to reduce the paper work and get an acceptable job done, it is necessary that everyone not only be told what is wanted, but also be convinced that he knows what is wanted and why it is essential.

✓ 4. How to get the guidance down the chain of command and how to do so without having it garbled is a problem. Telling it to group chiefs won't do. A better way would be to have the group chiefs invite you in to discuss with them and their supervisors your aims and objectives in career development and in the writing of fitness reports and whatever competitive evaluation is decided upon. Branch and division chiefs need to see the relationships between the evaluation of performance and career development and how both serve the overall objectives and philosophy of personnel handling to which you are committed. If the important points

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were put in writing, it would provide some insurance that they will not be garbled or forgotten.

25X1 5. Competitive Evaluation. I suspect competitive evaluation came into being partly in an attempt to overcome defects in the existing system. For one thing it gave supervisors an opportunity to present evidence they might choose to overlook if they had to face the employee. It also gave other supervisors a voice in the process. This usually got to the bottom of things. Basically, this is the way it used to work at NPIC, before  though it was never attempted on a Centerwide basis below GS-12. The paper work was fairly simple. A single sheet of paper, containing a short biographic sketch, a suggested CER, and a justification for same, was prepared for each person by his supervisor and vetted and signed by the division chief. The latter met in one or more (usually 2 or 3) special CSB meetings to do battle and produce the final ratings. These were frequently quite different from the initial proposals.

With the more recent system and its elaborate mechanism of point scoring sheets, summary sheets, panels, sub-panels, etc., we may have created the counterpart of the fitness reporting system with all its banalities. I think the present Frankenstein was born of the Performance Evaluation Guide sheet. I confess a weakness for point-scoring systems. I think they are most useful, however, at the level where they are created because they can be used judiciously there. The farther they travel from the source the more deceptively authoritative they become, particularly when they move into the hands of those progressively less well informed about what they purport to quantify.

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
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As we discussed yesterday, perhaps NPIC ratings should be confined to those in fairly high grades, those with whose performance board members are familiar. I am inclined to think now that GS-14 might be the bottom.

If this were done, there would be great rejoicing at the division and branch levels -- but for the wrong reason. This should not happen. This is a critical matter of the control of which I have spoken. I assume the evaluations would continue according to Agency regulation, but that <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ would be done in the groups. This decentralization needs to be accompanied by an assumption of responsibility and with a measure of good faith and judgment not yet generated at the division, branch, and section levels at any time in the history of the Center. The keys to success are 1) having the "right" supervisors, 2) providing ample guidance and understanding, and 3) a mechanism for monitoring the quality of their response. The seriousness of the problem will vary inversely as the grade. To keep the Center a dynamic organization in the face of an essentially stable T/O, it is imperative to identify the comers at an early date and pointedly to move them up through the ranks as rapidly as they merit it. At the same time it will be equally necessary to ensure that less competent people do not receive automatic promotions to the limit of head room. I can't think of any good way of doing this short of the intelligent commitment and steadfast determination of every branch and division chief. Such a situation does not now exist.

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6. Fitness Reports. In spite of their differences, fitness reports and competitive evaluations are not unrelated. There should be a reasonable



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amount of compatibility between them. This has not always been the case. For obvious reasons, fitness reports have tended to be less candid. Among less obvious reasons, I think, is a sense of justice on the part of the rater. Most supervisors do not sit down with their employees individually between fitness reports and discuss their performance with them. They may chew them out on occasion, but this is not what I have in mind.

Center supervisors need to know more about how an employee's performance should be monitored, about how to face up constructively to employee deficiencies, and how to write a good fitness report. Divisions and groups should understand that persons performing the same function should have comparable specific duties. All should take cognizance of the fact that not every employee is proficient or strong on the performance of his duties.

Undeserved fitness report ratings and pointless platitudes are demoralizing in the long run. The least to which a person is entitled is an honest appraisal of his work and his potential, and some help in correcting deficiencies through counsel and on-the-job or off-the-job training. Outstanding (I think the term too restrictive in its connotation.) performers too frequently are rated on fitness reports the same as those who are distinctly less able.

The Pressure Points. In spite of my reservation about fitness reporting (I would improve fitness reports rather than abandon them.), this is the most rewarding point at which to apply pressure. There should be a plan. Everyone should be adequately informed of what will be done and what is expected. Then there should be consistent follow-through.

Another pressure point is challenge a person's pride in his work and

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to do as well or better than his peers. The scheduling of periodic seminar discussions to deal with selected facets of personnel handling could serve not only as an occasion for stocktaking but also as a device for smoothing out differences from component to component in implementing the system. For senior Center managers, this might be done at the OSB.

You could sample and critique fitness reports from time to time with group chiefs as a means for checking up on how well they are discharging their responsibilities, including how well their subordinates are doing their part of the job. Some of the more pedestrian sampling could be staffed out by the Personnel Branch and their findings delivered to you for action. One time they might investigate the pertinence and uniformity with which specific duties are designated, another time the cogency of the narrative. Still another time they might examine variations in the distribution of "grades." Doubtlessly, you would be interested in learning more about a division or branch that seems to have nothing but excellent performers.

Finally, if the Center had some objective measure of productivity, this could be a very significant datum. However, until such time as there are prospects of using such information constructively without making the Center more like a factory, I think the disadvantages of this course of action outweigh the potential gains.

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